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The last decade has witnessed a marked increase in the incidence of
international political terrorism. International political terrorism
has emerged as a political weapon employed on a worldwide basis by
those who are dissatisfied with, or alienated from, the legitimate
international and/or national political process. International terror-
ism is perceived to represent a threat to a wide range of United States
national security goals. The hypothesis examined in this thesis is
that the threat which international terrorism represents to the United
States national security can be measured as a function of the threat
perceptions of experts concerned with combating terrorism and is cor-
related with terrorists 1 methods of operation, perceived saliency of
enemy and the treatment of the event by foreign broadcasts (FBIS)
.
Scale values are calculated which represent the consensus of expert
judges' perception of threat. Content Analysis of terrorist statements
is employed to measure the saliency of the terrorist enemy perceptions.
The methodology of multiple regression analysis is used to determine
the underlying aspects of terrorism which combine to explain the level
of threat represented by a terrorist incident.
The conclusions of this thesis provide the decision maker with valid
early warning indicators of emerging terrorist threat and a perspective
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In the past decade, transnational and international terrorist
activity has increased at an alarming rate and has been the subject
of much concern and expenditure of resources by world political
leaders. In particular, the number of terrorist groups, events,
targets, victims and damage caused by terrorist groups has in-
creased in almost exponential fashion in recent years. The develop-
ing ability of terrorist groups to operate on an international level
with modern weapons, means of communication and transportation has
increased their power and influence as a political entity. Litera-
ture addressing the causes, effects and implications of the new
global expansion of terrorism has also increased in almost exponen-
tial fashion in recent years; however, there have been very few
analytical studies of terrorist activity using statistical, method-
ological analysis of the nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio data
which resulted from incidents initiated by terrorist groups.
The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of terrorist
event activity on United States national security, investigating the
statistical relationships between threat to United States national
security, international terrorist events and saliency of enemy
perceptions by terrorist group members.
Jenkins, Brian M. , International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare




1 . United States National Security Threat
Threat is defined as "an indication of probable evil to come;
2
something that gives indication of causing evil or harm." Within the
context of national security affairs, the sensitivity and responsive-
ness to threat held by national regimes are critical driving forces be-
hind international behavior and were included within the definition of
threat for this study. The concept of national security which was uti-
lized was a very broad generalization which included political, military,
diplomatic and economic aspects. A threat, in this context, included
any direct or indirect outcome of a terrorist incident which could have
been perceived to be inimical to the national security. National
images and national agendas gave the identification and shape to threat
phenomena. National publics of modernized countries are conditioned to
respond to reports of threat situations in certain ways. Latent threat
persists and becomes activated from time to time through symbolic trig-
gering. Latent threat recognition involves the awareness that a pos-
sible condition of danger exists but is in the background of affairs.
Activated threat is cognitive, existential phenomena brought to the
foreground by its situational immediacy.
Activation of the threat associated with international terrorism
is contextual and dependent upon the interaction of a terrorist incident
with the existing local or international situation. Measuring the im-
mediacy and degree of threat associated with an incident of international
terrorism is best done by determining the perceptions of those experts
responsible for national policy concerning terrorist activity and of
those scholars and researchers studying the subject of terrorism.
2
Barnhart, Clarence L., The American College Dictionary , p. 1262,
Random House, 1956.

The cognitive awareness of a developing threat by a legitimate
decision maker is a function of organizational structure, experience,
education and attitude or frame of reference. For one to accurately
recognize a developing threat requires an awareness of identifiable
indicators of threat and a sensitivity to both the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of threat.
Underlying the methodology of this thesis is the assumption
that analysis of experts' perceptions regarding the threat can provide
insight into the aspects of threat which trigger increased threat
awareness on the part of decision makers.
Terrorism has had traumatic influences upon United States
national policies, including the interruption of normal diplomatic
relations, disruption in trade and economic relations, transportation
services and agreements with other nation states vital to United States
national security. In addition, the economic and manpower resource
burden to the United States has increased drastically as new and more
intense security measures are established to counter potential terrorism.
The development of a quantitative measure of the qualitative as-
pects of terrorist threat is intended to provide decision makers with
greater insight into those aspects which are statistically associated
with increasing or developing threat.
Substantial disagreement exists concerning the threat which
international terrorism represents. At its best, the concept of threat
is very soft and difficult to measure. The reality of what is threaten-
ing and the degree of threat represented can be operationally defined in
a consensus of the perceptions of experts concerned with the subject.
Implied in the investigation was a determination of the underlying as-
pects of international terrorism which contributed significantly to the
threat perceptions of experts.
12

2. Saliency of Enemy Perceptions
Generally, a group defines its enemy or enemies as another actor
perceived to be threatening, harmful or injurious to the group's welfare
or wishes.
As most groups, terrorist groups have contradictory and mutually
exclusive interests with most political actors. Identifying and com-
bating enemies for the purpose of managing conflict and realizing goals
is inherent in political strategies. Once a terrorist group sees a
political actor as a source of frustration or threat, negative attitudes
are generated and any act of hostility by either the terrorist group or
the political actor is conducive to producing greater hostility between
them. When members of a terrorist group (rightly or wrongly) perceive
a threat, unjust treatment or invasion of rights coming from a political
actor, opinion is crystallized, slogans are formulated and the group
itself, as well as its goals, are affected by reciprocal antagonisms.
Through identifying an enemy and portraying him as the incarnation
of evil, the terrorist group assumes a position of self-righteousness.
In effect, this means transcending the threat by elevating the group to
a position of superiority. Such assumptions tend to produce grandiose
feelings of power, invulnerability and strength.
Self-righteousness is also a means of reducing stress, of protect-
ing the terrorist group against threats, of satisfying group needs for
security or emotional release. It is a method of reducing internal
conflict by displacing those conflicts onto external scapegoats and
achieving greater group cohesiveness. In particular, the enemy becomes
an integral part of the terrorist group's immediate and long-range prob-
lems of survival, maintenance of group solidarity and fulfillment of
13

perceived (even loosely defined) goals. A more in-depth theoretical base
on the subject of enemies has been written by Finlay, Holsti and Fagen.^
The higher the degree of saliency of the perceived enemy of a
terrorist group, the greater the perceived threat to the group and the
more urgent the need for an appropriate response to that threat. Accord-
ingly, it is hypothesized that the greater the degree of saliency of a
terrorist group's perceived enemy, the greater the degree of probable
hostile response directed at that threat (the perceived enemy) , with the
consequent impact on stability.
Appendix A lists the saliency of enemy perception dimensions used
as the theoretical framework for developing intensity categories of con-
tent analysis when coding terrorist statements.
C. HYPOTHESIS
It is hypothesized that the threat to United States national security
by terrorist activity is directly related to the amount of Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) coverage, the number of non-
combatants killed, the perceived saliency of a terrorist group's de-
fined enemy, the demands made upon legitimate institutional actors and
the number of terrorist groups participating in an event.
Verification of the hypothesis would provide the decision maker with
verifiable measurements of terrorist activity by which a determination
is possible concerning emerging or developing threat. Accordingly, ad-
vanced accurate decisions would be possible concerning the allocation of
resources to counter the potential threat.
3Finlay, David J., Holsti, Ole R. , and Fagen, Richard B., Enemies In




Formalized procedures were developed for the collection of information
to facilitate the production of raw data used in developing specific
variables for statistical manipulation and analysis.
1. Data Collection
In an effort to obtain information concerning threat to United
States national security, a questionnaire was developed to obtain re-
sponses from individuals who were considered to be experts in the fields
of national security affairs and terrorist activity. This procedure was
conducted to investigate the perceptions held by experts regarding the
threat which specific international terrorist events represent to the
national security objectives of the United States. The assumption is
that the reality of the threat of terrorism is expressed as a statistical
consensus of the perceptions of those experts closely associated with
the problem. Various methods of content analysis were employed to col-
lect data on FBIS Daily Report content and saliency of enemy perceptions.
Raw statistical data on the number of foreign non-combatants that were
killed, the demands made upon legitimate organizational actors, the
number of terrorist groups participating in an event and the number of
domestic non-combatants killed was obtained by in-depth study and analysis
of each terrorist event selected for study.
2. Data Analysis
Following the collection and organization of raw data to
develop variables for statistical manipulation, the newly acquired data
was submitted to frequency distributions, transformation of raw data as
required to obtain normality, bivariate correlation, factor analysis and





1. The ITERATE File
The International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
(ITERATE) File was utilized to obtain a universe of analysis and a
sample for detailed analysis. The ITERATE code book was used to in-
terpret the statistical data in the ITERATE computerized filing system
for information germane to terrorist events. ITERATE was based upon
public source documents, including articles in the New York Times and
the Washington Post
,
written at the time of the incidents, and two
chronologies of international terrorism developed by The Rand Corpora-
tion. The file was assembled for use by the Political Research Section
of the Central Intelligence Agency, from which it was obtained. The
file covers all international terrorist events for the period 1968 to
1974 for which there is public source material.
The universe of analysis was defined as that set of international
terrorist incidents which may have represented a threat to the United
States national security. The concept of national security which was
utilized was a very broad generalization which includes political, military,
diplomatic and economic aspects.
A set of terrorist incidents with the potential to represent this
type of threat to the national security were selected, using the follow-
ing criteria:
a. United States government installation or official involved
as a target,
4Micklus, Edward F., ITERATE: International Terrorism: Attributes
of Terrorist Events
,




b. United States corporation involved as a target,
c. United States citizen involved as a target,
d. United States government was subjected to demands,
e. United States ship or aircraft was involved,
f. The terrorist incident took place in any of the
locations listed in Table I.
































An incident meeting any single criteria was selected for inclusion
in the universe of analysis. The list of inclusive locations was based
upon alliances, trade agreements, possession of strategic materials or
strategic location, any of which could result in an international terror-
ist incident in that location having an inimical effect on United States
interests.
Applying these criteria to the 539 cases in the ITERATE file re-
sulted in a set of 386 cases. Of the 386 cases, those incidents in which
an identifiable terrorist group was involved were selected. In view of
the nature of the ITERATE file (which was developed to apply quantifiable
data to terrorist events), those events having unknown terrorist group
identification also had a preponderance of missing data for the majority
of data associated with them, precluding in-depth analysis of the event.
17

In addition, the measures used within this study were directly associated
with established terrorist groups. This selection reduced the number of
cases to 214. This selection was based on the nature of the independent
variable being primarily applicable to terrorist incidents involving an
established known terrorist group. The set of 214 cases was established
as the universe for analysis. From this universe, a random sample of 29
cases was selected for detailed analysis and development of the depend-
ent and independent variables.
Appendix B contains the detailed description of the 29-case random
sample. Table II lists the basic correlation between the random sample
and the universe of analysis.
Table II. Correlation Between Random Sample of 29 Cases
From 214 Cases In The Universe of Analysis
VARIABLE




Identity of Terrorist Group








Quantitative data from the ITERATE File were initially selected
as independent variables based on the following criteria:
a. A reasonable association with the threat which a terrorist
incident could be perceived to represent to United States
national security.
b. Composed of interval or ratio level data enabling the
utilization of parametric and regression analysis as
an analytical tool.
Table III is a listing of variables which met those criteria and
were initially selected as Potential Independent Variables.
'Jenkins, Brian M. , Rand Chronology
,
The Rand Corporation, 1974.
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Table III. Potential Independent Variables
1. Number of terrorist groups involved.
2. Number of terrorist nationalities.
3. Number of terrorists.
4. Number of male terrorists.
5. Number of female terrorists.
6. Mean age of group members.
7. Age range of group members.
8. Number of victim nationalities.
9. Number of hostages.
10. Number of governments upon which demands were made.
11. Number of international entities upon which demands were made
12. Number of domestic non-combatants wounded.
13. Number of foreign non-combatants wounded.
14. Number of police wounded.
15. Number of domestic non-combatants killed.
16. Number of foreign non-combatants killed.
17. Number of police killed.
18. Dollar value of other losses.
19. Number of prisoners whose release is demanded.
20. Number of prisoners released.
21. Number of terrorists dead at scene in a shoot-out.
22. Number of terrorists who blew themselves up at scene.
23. Length of the incident.
2. Content Analysis
a. Purpose
One of the major hypotheses of this study is that the threat
to United States security will be directly related to how clearly a
terrorist group perceives its enemy. For example, when a terrorist
group such as the Movimento Revolucionario-8 of Brazil kidnapped the U.S.
Ambassador, they made direct statements in the press reflecting that the
U.S. was their primary enemy and any government or person associated with
U.S. interests are to be targeted, demanding the release of 15 prisoners,
being held by Brazilian authorities, who were eventually released and
flown to Mexico. In contrast, a group calling itself Nationalist Group
For The Liberation of Palestine gave two vacationing American females a
concealed bomb as a going away gift in Italy. The bomb damaged the
19

luggage compartment of the El Al Airlines plane, but the group failed to
make statements as to their intentions or cause. In an effort to measure
a terrorist group's perception of its enemy's saliency, two intensity-
directed content analysis procedures were followed. During the process
of collecting direct terrorist statements to analyze their content,
several quantitative content collection methods were employed,
b. Sampling Universe, Population and Unit of Analysis
The major source of data collected, both of qualitative and
quantitative content, was the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
Daily Report , which contains current news and commentary monitored from
foreign broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers and periodicals.
FBIS is published in eight volumes: (1) People's Republic of China,
(2) Eastern Europe, (3) Soviet Union, (4) Asia and Pacific, (5) Middle
East and North Africa, (6) Latin America, (7) Western Europe and (8) Sub-
Sahara Africa. The FBIS Daily Report is on file for public "reference at
the Library of Congress and at public libraries throughout the United
States. All FBIS Daily Reports were screened for data relevant to the
twenty-nine terrorist events studied from between thirty days prior to
the initiation of the event until thirty days after completion of the
event
.
The New York Times daily newspaper was used to augment data
collected from FBIS. Additional terrorist statements were found to be
available in New York Times that were not available in FBIS. Only
direct terrorist statements were obtained from New York Times for
qualitative content analysis. No quantitative content data was com-
piled from New York Times for this study.
Classified material, including manuscripts, files, documents
and records containing statements of terrorist group members, are
20

available at the Office of Political Research, Central Intelligence Agency
and the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, U. S. Department of State,
as well as many large metropolitan Police departments and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Information contained within these sources
would be ideal data for qualitative content analysis methods; however,
it was decided early in the formation of this study to develop a method-
ology based on open source literature, which could be applied using
classified data should it be available to the researcher,
c. Terrorist Event Parameters
Specific volumes of FBIS Daily Reports were selected for
screening based upon the country in which the event was initiated, the
nationality of the terrorist group members, the nationality of any
victims, or any country which was further implicated by having demands
made upon it or by granting a safe haven to the terrorists or victims of
the event.
In collecting data for analysis from FBIS and New York Times
,
the analyst screened all Daily Reports from thirty days before the
initiation of the event to thirty days following the completion of the
event. The initiation and completion dates for each event were obtained
from the ITERATE file referenced in paragraph 1, page 16.
Data was compiled from FBIS Daily Reports which related to the
terrorist group responsible for the event within the time period stipulated
above. Again, the terrorist group responsible was originally determined
by the ITERATE file; however, the terrorist group identified by the ITERATE
file as responsible for each of the twenty-nine events was verified by the
analyst from supporting statements in FBIS or New York Times . It became
evident early in the collection of data for analysis that some terrorist
groups (such as the IRA and PFLP) were quite active, receiving a great
21

deal of coverage in FBIS concerning their activities, prior to and follow-
ing the event, which did not relate directly to the event under study.
Accordingly, a more discriminating study was undertaken of these reports
in FBIS to isolate a terrorist group's general activity from information
relating to the specific event under study.
The target or object of the terrorist event was also focused
upon in reviewing specific FBIS Daily Reports within the time frame
specified above for specific information relating to the event. In many
cases, there were articles, and even terrorist statements, directed to-
ward what was later the target of the event, which provided data for
future content analysis.
d. Quantitative Methodology
Using content analysis, eight variables were constructed for
each of the twenty-nine events under study: (1) number of FBIS lines
prior to the event, (2) number of FBIS lines after the event, (3) total
number of FBIS lines, (4) number of FBIS articles relating to the event,
(5) number of FBIS issue dates containing information on the event,
(6) number of Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis statements, (7) number
of Expanded Directional Analysis statements and (8) number of lines in
FBIS within country of incident's occurrence.
Data compiled for "FBIS lines prior to the event" was obtained
by reviewing all material specified by sub-paragraph c above on Terrorist
Event Parameters which occurred from thirty days prior to the initiation
of the event up to, but not including, lines relating to the event after
its initiation.
Data compiled for "FBIS lines after the event was initiated"
was obtained by reviewing all material specified by sub-paragraph c above
on Terrorist Event Parameters which occurred from the actual time of
22

initiation of the event to thirty days following the completion of the
event. For incidents such as bombings or assassinations, the time
spectrum would be thirty days; however, for such incidents as hijackings
or kidnappings, the time spectrum would extend from thirty days after
the release of hostages, or other indicators of the event's termination.
Accordingly, many of the events had more than thirty days coverage for
this method of data collection.
"Total number of FBIS lines" is the total of the number of
FBIS Daily Report lines before and after the event. Accordingly, all
information from thirty days prior to the initiation of the incident
to thirty days following termination of the event was compiled under
"total lines."
Since some events became international in their physical
domain by moving from one country to another or by terrorists placing
demands on nation states other than the one in which the event was
initiated, a line count was conducted for only that FBIS Daily Report
content which was contained within the specific country in which the
event was initiated. The same parameters for collecting data as pre-
scribed in sub-paragraph c above were used.
Using Terrorist Event Parameters stipulated in sub-paragraph
c above, a count of FBIS articles relating to the event was compiled for
each of the twenty-nine events. (Later in this study, an article will
be defined as a theme for qualitative analysis.)
"FBIS Daily Report issue dates" containing information rele-
vant to each of the twenty-nine events were counted under the requirements
set forth in sub-paragraph c, Terrorist Event Parameters, above.
Using the qualitative method of Expanded Directional Analysis,
the number of terrorist statements was totaled for each of the twenty-nine
23

events, also following the stipulations of sub-paragraph c, Terrorist
Event Parameters, above.
In addition, using Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis, the
number of terrorist statements was totaled for each of the twenty-nine
events. Using this method, the number of statements was generally less
than the number of statements compiled under Expanded Directional Analy-
sis since Atomic Evaluative Analysis requires a complete grammatical
sentence with structure for coding; whereas, phrases can be coded using
Expanded Directional Analysis.
e. Qualitative Methodology
Two intensity directed content analysis techniques were
employed, using statements by terrorist group members contained in
FBIS and New York Times from thirty days before initiation of the event
to thirty days after termination of the event. Data analysis was based
on statements contained within quotation marks in FBIS and New York Times
which were directly attributable to a member of the terrorist group
known to be responsible for the initiation or conduct of the event. After
screening all FBIS Daily Reports for terrorist statements, it became ap-
parent that an additional source of content would be required because of
the limited number of statements in open source literature. Accordingly,
New York Times was used to locate additional terrorist statements for
analysis.
Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis, as developed by Osgood,
Saporta and Nunnelly," employs an Attitude Object assigning a negative or
positive value to the subject of the sentence. A Verbal Connector, which
is the predicate or verb of the sentence, is assigned a score between one
"Holsti, Ole R., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities
,
p. 124, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
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and three, depending on the past, future or present tense of the verb,
respectively. In addition, a positive or negative value is assigned,
depending upon the connotation of the predicate. Undetermined or neutral
verbs and/or predicates are assigned positive scores. Also, a Common
Meaning Term or second Attitude Object is coded by assigning a value of
between minus three and plus three, depending upon' the degree of threat
denoted by the object, where minus three is most threatening and positive
three is least threatening. Figure 1 defines the procedure used to code
terrorist statements using Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis.
(ATTITUDE OBJECT) (VERBAL CONNECTOR) (COMMON MEANING TERM) = PRODUCT
(+ 1) (-3 to +5) (-3 to +3) = (-9) to (+9)
Figure 1. Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis Statement Scoring
Each complete terrorist statement is coded for the article in
which it appears. A mean score is obtained by dividing the number of state-
ments coded into the cumulative score obtained by algebraically combining
the products of the coded statements. The resultant mean is termed the
Theme Score for that specific article. An event's Atomic Evaluative Asser-
tion Analysis score is obtained from the mean of Theme Scores. Table IV
is an example of actual terrorist statements scored using Assertion Analysis
Table IV. Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis
Terrorist Statement Coding Example
Event: Bombing of Australian Tourist Office in New York City, 4 July 1968.
ATTITUDE OBJECT VERBAL CONNECTOR COMMON MEANING = PRODUCT
(+ 1) (-5 to +3) (-3 to +3)
"We (+1) are risking (-3) imprisonment." (-2) = (-6)




Event: Kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 4 September 1969
ATTITUDE OBJECT VERBAL CONNECTOR COMMON MEANING = PRODUCT
( + 1) (-3 to +3) (-3 to +3)
"Those who mistreat(-l) should take (+2) caution." (-1) = (-2)
"The situation (+1) was (+1) not good." (-1) = (-1)
"We (+1) feel (+3) we are free." (+3) = (+9)
Expanded Directional Analysis, as developed by Kaplan and
7
Goldsen, employs the use of a directional differential scale where the
researcher assigns a negative, positive or neutral ordinal judgment to the
action (verb) of the statement, phrase or sentence. The statement's
Verbal Connector is assigned an intensity score of between one and three,
depending upon the tense of the verb, where present tense is assigned a
score of three, future tense is assigned a score of two, and past tense
is assigned a score of one. In addition, a numerical value is assigned
to the Common Meaning Term (or object) of the statement which has been
divided into six ordinal categorical judgment groupings, most threaten-
ing being equal to a minus three and least threatening being equal to plus
three. Figure 2 defines the procedure used to code terrorist statements
using the Expanded Directional Analysis method. Each statement is coded
for the article in which it appears.
(DIRECTIONAL DIFFERENTIAL) (VERBAL CONNECTOR) (COMMON MEANING TERM) = PRODUCT
(-2/+2) (1 to 3) (-3 to +3) = (-18)to( + 18)
Figure 2. Expanded Directional Analysis Statement Scoring




Event Scores are obtained using the same procedures as in
Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis. Table V is an example of the raw
data scoring of each event found to have direct statements from terrorist
group members within the parameters stated above.
Table V. Expanded Directional Analysis Terrorist Statement Coding Example
Event: Killing of U.S. Military Group Commander in Guatemala, 16 Jan 68
DIRECTIONAL DIFFERENTIAL VERBAL CONNECTOR COMMON MEANING = PRODUCT
Q2/ + 2) (1 to 3) (-3 to +5)
"brought" (1) "brought" (1) "combative action"(-2) = (-2)
"are risking" (-2) "are risking"(3) "imprisonment" (-2) =(-12)
Event: Kidnapping of U.S. Labor Attache to Guatemala, 6 Mar 70
"be" (1) "be" (2) "publicized" (2) = (4)
f. Reliability
Two basic procedures were employed to insure reliability of
data collected and coded: computation of a reliability score for coders
and production of standards for the Attituded Object, Verbal Connector
and Common Meaning Term categories.
For content analysis, reliability means repeatability with
consistency of results. In measurement (or the assignment of scores),
reliability means that coders using the same techniques on the same
material will get substantially the same results, which is sometimes
referred to as information stability. Accordingly, a reliability test
o




a reliability test where C-, + C 2 is the total of category assignments









Figure 3. Two Coder Reliability Test
Using the formula for two separate coders to test the relia-
bility for the Attitude Object, Verbal Connector and Common Meaning Term
categories where judgments were required on all terrorist statements for
two separate events, a reliability score of .98 was achieved.
In addition, for Atomic Evaluative Assertion Analysis, stand-
ard lists of categories were constructed to assist the coder and insure
reliability between different coders and scoring of different statements,
themes and events by the same recorder. Appendix C is an alphabetical
listing of all Attitude Objects (subjects) which were assigned negative
values (e.g.: attack, barricade, bomb, death, detain, fear, torture,
violate, etc.). All other nouns representing the subject of the statement
being coded were assigned a positive value. Appendix D is an alphabetical
list of Verbal Connectors (e.g.: accuse, demand, endanger, kidnap,
risking, struck, violate, etc.). As stated previously, the tense of the
verb in the predicate determined if the value was one, two or three, de-
pending respectively upon the present, future or past tense. The degree
of threat reflected by a terrorist statement was the criteria used for de-
termining six distinct categories for evaluating the Common Meaning Term.
Appendix E is an alphabetical listing of terms representing the object of a
28

statement and the assigned value of negative three scores for most
threatening terms to positive three scores for least threatening terms,
as defined by perceptions of threat in Chapter I.
g. Validity
Two checks were made for insuring that the results of both
the Directional Assertion and Atomic Evaluative Analysis were valid:
first was the face validity of each theme, and secondly, the final raw
data event scales defined below in paragraph i were examined to insure
logical validity.
For each theme, the overall impression of the analyst con-
cerning the article was compared with the theme score derived by the
method introduced in paragraph g above to insure that both the impres-
sion and the raw theme score were compatible with one another. Primarily,
this validity check took the form of checking to determine if the sub-
jective impression given by reading the article was as negative in effect
as the raw theme score seemed to indicate.
Finally, each of the events were compared to one another,
along with the event scores, to insure that a dramatic difference in the
conduct of the event was evidenced by some difference in the raw event
scores. For instance, an event of an attempted bank robbery incident
was compared with an incident involving kidnapping, torture and finally
assassination, the latter of which one might logically expect to pro-
duce statements indicating a greater degree of perceived threat by the
perpetrators than the first incident,
h. Level of Data
The ordinal judgments of the coder for qualitative content
analysis, combined with the Directional Assertion and Atomic Evaluative
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Assertion methodologies, both employ intensity and direction techniques
which qualify data for interval interpretations of findings when compared
with content information examined under the same standards using the
9
same source and universe of analysis. Accordingly, statistical
manipulation of data addressed in Chapter III on Data Analysis is based
on interval event scales.
i. Independent Variable Threat Perception Scales
Number of Lines in FBIS Prior To The Event, Number Of Lines
In FBIS After The Event, Total Number Of Lines In FBIS For Each Event,
Number Of FBIS Daily Report Issues Relating To The Event, Number Of
FBIS Articles Relating To The Event, Number Of FBIS Lines In The Country
In Which The Event Occurred, Number Of Expanded Directional Terrorist
Statements In FBIS and New York Times
,
and Number Of Atomic Evaluative
Assertion Analysis Terrorist Statements in FBIS and New York Times comprise
the eight quantitative content variables. Atomic Evaluative Assertion
Analysis and Expanded Directional Analysis comprise the two qualitative
content analysis variables. Below is a list of the ten content variables
with the three top (or highest scoring) events and the three bottom (or
lowest scoring) events for each variable. The event identification and
date is followed by the raw score.
(1) FBIS Lines Prior To The Event:
(a) #56 Attack on GM Plant, Uruguay, 1969 -- 332 lines;
(b) #102 Kidnapping U.S. Attache, Guatemala, 1970--155 lines
(c) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 131 lines;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1969 -- lines;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- lines; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- lines.
(2) FBIS Lines After Event:




(b) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- 1227 lines;
(c) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 131 lines;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- lines;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- lines; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- lines.
(3) Total FBIS Lines Per Event:
(a) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1972 -- 2665 lines;
(b) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- 1280 lines;
(c) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil 1969 -- 995 lines;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- lines;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- lines; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- lines.
(4) FBIS DAILY REPORT Issues Per Event:
(a) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 23 issues;
(b) #56 Attack on GM Plant, Uruguay, 1969 -- 20 issues;
(c) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil 1969 -- 16 issues;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- issues;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- issues; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- issues.
(5) FBIS Articles Per Event:
(a) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 91 articles;
(b) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 32 articles;
(c) #56 Attack on GM Plant, Uruguay, 1969 -- 26 articles;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- articles;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- articles; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- articles.
(6) FBIS Country Lines Per Event:
(a) # 161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 1679 lines;
(b) # 68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 883 lines;
(c) # 471 Premier Carrero Assinated, Madrid, 1973 -- 483 lines;
(d) # 281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- lines;
(e) # 283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens 1972 -- lines; and
(f) # 350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- lines.
(7) Number of Atomic Analysis Statements Per Event:
(a) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1964 -- 199 statements;
(b) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 113 statements;
(c) #470 Bombing in London, 1973 -- 92 statements;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, 1972 -- statements;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- statements; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- statements;
(8) Number of Directional Analysis Statements Per Event:
(a) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 214 statements;
(b) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 124 statements;
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(c) #470 Bombing in London, 1973 -- 101 statements;
(d) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- statements;
(e) #283 Bombing U.S. Embassy, Athens, 1972 -- statements; and
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1972 -- statements.
(9) Atomic Assertion Content Analysis:
(a) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- (-6.00) assertion;
(b) #50 Attempted Bombing Cuban Consulate, Montreal, 1969 (-4.00);
(c) #419 Attempted Hijacking Israel Airliner, Greece, 1973 -- (-3.50);
(d) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- (+0.67) assertion;
(e) #454 British Consul Kidnapped, Mexico, 1973 -- (+1.50); and
(f) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- (+2.00) assertion.
(10) Expanded Directional Content Analysis:
(a) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- (-6.00) assertion;
(b) #50 Attempted Hijacking Israel Airliner, Greece, 1973 -- (-5.50);
(c) #336 Turkish Consul General Murdered, Los Angeles, 1973 -- (-3);
(d) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- (+0.72) assertion;
(e) #281 Bombing Israel Airliner, Italy, 1972 -- (3.00); and
(£) #454 British Consul Kidnapped, Mexico, 1973 -- (+3.4) assertion.
Each quantitative analysis scale has a rank order ranking from
most to least number of lines, articles, dates or statements. The
two qualitative scales have a rank order from most salient enemy threat,




The concept of a survey of expert opinion as a means of measuring
the expert's threat perceptions and utilization of statistical methods
to combine the responses of the experts into a scale of threat was de-
veloped as a means of obtaining a quantitative measure of threat.
A questionnaire was developed which requested the experts to provide
ordinal data by ranking the sample terrorist incidents in the order of
the threat which they perceived the incident to represent to United
States national security objectives. The concept of threat and national
security objectives was left intentionally vague in the questionnaire to
tap the spontaneous, undirected responses of the experts.
The responses to the questionnaire were developed into an interval
level scale where each incident was assigned an interval level value
by a statistical process based on the following assumptions concerning
the behavior of the experts:
1. The experts cannot directly express their perceptions concerning
the threat of an incident in terms of an interval scale value, but are
able to rank the incidents in relation to all others in accordance with
their perceptions of the threat which each represents.
2. Over the population of the experts, their perceptions of the
threat are normally distributed random variable.
3. All incidents possess the same variance of threat perceived over
the population of experts.
4. The correlation coefficient for the threat between any pair of
incidents is the same.




The list of experts was developed through contact with governmental
and military organizations responsible for the development of policy
recommendations for countering terrorism, and from attendance lists of
recent conferences concerned with the subject of terrorism.
The list was comprised of experts in the government, military, law
enforcement, academic and policy research communities and from private
enterprise. Appendix F lists the number of questionnaires submitted to
each professional community with the number of responses received for
coding.
Procedures for the development of the threat questionnaire had the
following objectives:
1. Obtain expert perceptions concerning the threat a terrorist
incident represents to United States national security interests, rela-
tive to the threat represented by other incidents in a sample of twenty-
nine past terrorist events;
2. Take full advantage of the experts' experience and perceptions
by providing only very general and vague concepts of threat and the
national security interest.
The questionnaire was limited to one page of instructions and pro-
vided the respondent with a set of five-by-seven cards describing the
incidents, as stated in Appendix B, and a post card on which to record
the ordinal ranking of the events. The cards were used to facilitate
the respondents ordering and re-ordering the incidents until satisfied
with the ranking. The post card allowed the respondent to remain anony-
mous, if so desired, or to obtain a copy of the questionnaire results by
including his return address on the post card.
The sample size of twenty-nine incidents was determined to be too
large a sample to ask a judge to rank without expending more time and
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effort than it was reasonable to ask of expert professionals who have
many demands on their time. Accordingly, the sample was divided into
two representative samples, each with three common incidents. A sample
size of sixteen was determined to be a reasonable number to ask an ex-
pert to rank by threat. The three common points on the two scales per-
mitted joining the two with a linear transformation and thus obtaining
a scale of all twenty-nine incidents. A linear transformation was
utilized, based on the two points out of the three common points
with the least variance across the complete set of scales. Appendix G
is a copy of the specific questionnaire which was mailed to expert judges.
Individual scales were developed to represent the consensus of the
experts in each community and two scales to represent the overall consensus
Two procedures were utilized to develop two different overall scales. One
procedure involved combining all the responses and developing a scale in
the same manner as each individual scale was developed. The other pro-
cedure involved utilizing the individual scales developed for each com-
munity and calculating a mean scale value for each incident. The first
procedure gave more weight to the community with the greatest number of
responses and with the greatest internal consensus regarding their threat
perceptions. The second procedure equally weights each individual com-
munity's scale in developing the overall scale. Appendix H contains the
procedures by which the threat scales were developed from the raw data
submitted by expert respondents. It also contains the ordinal raw data
judgments submitted by expert respondents and the conversion process used
to transform the data to an interval scale.
Upon completion of the scale development process with the solution
of the network of simultaneous equations, two scales (one for each set
of incidents) had been produced for each separate community and for the
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overall scale. It was necessary to combine the two scales of sixteen
incidents for each community and the overall scale into one scale for
all twenty-nine incidents. As stated earlier, each scale had three
common points, the two points with the smallest variance over the com-
plete population of the scale were chosen to develop a linear transform-
ation. The scale developed from the smallest number of respondents was
transformed onto the scale with the largest number of respondents. The
following points were in common on all scales:
1. Incident number 50 dated 20 May 1969 variance = 0.07378
2. Incident number 68 dated 4 September 1969 variance = 0.24385
3. Incident number 336 dated 27 January 1973 variance = 0.25921
Incidents 50 and 68 were chosen as the common points and the linear trans-
formation was established to combine the scales as listed in Table VI.
Table VI.
Linear Transformations Used To Combine Interval Scales
Government Y = 1.08X - .627






To render the scales easier for visual inspection, the origin was
moved to 1.0 by adding the smallest value plus 1.0 to all the scale
values within each scale. This also placed each scale on the same origin,
again making visual inspection easier, with the lowest event score set at
a value of 1.0.
Threat perceptions for the overall scale, the government scale, the
military scale and the private enterprise scale are presented below. The
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Y = .426X + .09
Y = .615X + .431
Y = .362X + .05
Y = .945X + .44
Y = .92X - .05

four most threatening and the four least threatening incidents are
reported for each scale. Each incident has been assigned an interval
level numerical value indicating the threat it was perceived to represent.
These values are transformations of the raw scale values developed in
the scaling process. The transformation is linear as it conforms to
the Y = AX + B formula. This linear transformation was developed based
upon the same two points for each scale. One point is from each of the
two middle quartiles and has the smallest variance in the quartile. This
type of transformation was made to provide scale values composed of
whole numbers to facilitate visual comparison and to allow the extremes
of the scales to fully represent the range of the perceptions of the
experts.
The four most threatening and four least threatening incidents on
each threat scale are described briefly and followed by their scale
value. A more complete description of each incident is available in
Appendix B.
1. Threat Scores — All Experts Combined:
(a) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 61;
(b) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 59;
(c) #102 Kidnapping U.S. Labor Attache, Guatemala, 1970 -- 56;
(d) #2 Killing U.S. Military Group Commander, Guatemala, 1968 -- 56;
(e) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- 24;
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- 23;
(g) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- 21; and
(h) #487 Bank Robbery, London, 1974 -- 19.
2. Threat Scores -- Government Sample:
(a) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 69;
(b) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 64;
(c) #102 Kidnapping U.S. Labor Attache, Guatemala, 1970 -- 62;
(d) #329 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Haiti, 1973 -- 61;
(e) #516 Attempted Airliner Hijacking, Japan, 1974 -- 31;
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- 27;
(g) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- 23; and
(h) #50 Attempted Bombing Cuban Consulate, Montreal, 1969 -- 20.
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3. Threat Scores -- Military Experts:
(a) #2 Killing U.S. Military Group Commander, Guatemala, 1968 -- 58;
(b) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 56;
(c) #56 Damage to GM Plant, Uruguay, 1969 -- 51;
(d) #161 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 50;
(e) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- 28;
(f) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- 27;
(g) #487 Bank Robbery, London, 1974 -- 19; and
(h) #13 Bombing Australian Tourist Office, New York, 1968 -- 13.
4. Threat Scores -- Private Enterprise Experts:
(a) #61 Hijacking Three Airliners, Jordan, 1970 -- 64;
(b) #68 Kidnapping U.S. Ambassador, Brazil, 1969 -- 63;
(c) #439 Capture of Terrorist With Anti-Air Missiles, Rome, 1973 --56;
(d) #329 Kidnapping, U.S. Ambassador, Haiti, 1973 -- 56;
(e) #374 Bombing Italian Consulate, Athens, 1973 -- 23;
(f) #349 Bombing, London, 1973 -- 19;
(g) #517 Bombing, Manchester, 1974 -- 19; and
(h) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- 11.
5. The four incidents with the largest variance of scores across all
the scales were the incidents where the greatest diversity of threat
perceptions were reported. Each incident is briefly described, followed
by the variance for the scores for that incident:
(a) #374 Bombing Italian Consulate Car, Athens, 1973 -- 71;
(b) #350 Bombing Dance Hall, Glasgow, 1973 -- 61;
(c) #349 Bombing, London, 1973 -- 57; and
(d) #112 Hijacking Airliner, Japan, 1970 -- 55.
6. The four incidents with the smallest variance of scores were those
where the greatest consensus of perceptions of threat was reported. The
incidents are briefly described, followed by the variance of all the
scores for that incident:
(a) #239 Jordanian Ambassador Attempted Assassination, London,
1971 -- 42;
(b) #470 Bombing, London, 1973 -- 42; s
(c) #250 Bombing, Aldershot, England, 1972 -- 43; and
(d) #56 Damage to GM Plant, Uruguay, 1969 -- 43.
Appendix I contains the complete raw data results of all dependent
and independent variables developed by the researchers. The data con-
tained in the Appendix was the base for further statistical analysis





Having selected the independent variable from the ITERATE file and
having scaled the independent variables developed through content analysis,
it was possible to begin the statistical analysis of the data. The
scaling procedures and variables selected from the ITERATE file resulted
in all interval or ratio level data, and thus it was possible to utilize
the strongest forms of data analysis.
The final objective of the data analysis was to develop a multiple
regression equation which explains a significant portion of the variance
in the dependent variables.
B. DATA DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSFORMATIONS
The raw frequencies of all the independent variables (with the
exception of the two variables obtained by qualitative content analysis)
were sufficiently skewed that the data required transformation to
conform to the assumptions of normal distribution and linearity. The
data was transformed as follows:
1. LOG (X + 1) and LOG (X + 2) was applied to highly right
skewed distributions; and
2. Square Root was applied to moderately right skewed distributions.
Table VII is the transformation applied to each of the independent
variables and the correlation between the raw and transformed variables.
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Table VII. Independent Variable Data Transformation
TRANSFORMED CORRELATION
VARIABLE TRANSFORMATION
LG 10 + 2
WITH RAW DATA
NUMGRPS 1.00
NUMTER LG 10 + 2 .99
NUVICNAT SQ RT .99
NUMHOST LG 10 + 2 .06
NUMGOV LG 10 + 2 .99
NUENTS LG 10 + 2 .99
KILLDOM LG 10 + 2 .99
KILLFOR SQ RT 1.0
LENGTH LG 10 + 2 - .06
LINESPRI LG 10 .85
LINESAFT LG 10 .64
TOTALLINES LG 10 .66
CNTRYLIN LG 10 .66
FBISDATE LG 10 .77
ARTCLS LG 10 .77
ATOMICANA N/A N/A
ATOMICSTN LG 10 .81
DRCTNANA N/A N/A
DRCTNST LG 10 .79
C. VARIABLE SELECTION
After the correlation between the raw and the transformed variables,
a determination was made concerning the validity of using the transformed
variable for further analysis. A highly positive correlation indicated
that the results of further analysis would not be adversely affected by
the transformation. Low positive or negative correlations indicated the
possibility of inconsistencies in the future analysis, resulting from the
utilization of the transformed variables. This aspect was considered in
selecting variables for further analysis.
The problem of missing data was also addressed. Those variables in
which significant proportions of missing data existed were identified and
a determination made if the missing data could be acquired or if the vari-
able must be removed from further analysis. Through additional research
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it was possible to determine the number of terrorists involved in all the
sample incidents. This data was obtained from FBIS, New York Times , London
Times and the Los Angeles Times .
For content analysis variables, a mean score was determined to be a
valid event score and was utilized for those incidents having no terrorist
statement during the required time period in either the FBIS Daily Report
or the New York Times .
As a result of this phase of the data analysis, several variables were
excluded from further analysis. Table VIII lists those variables excluded
from further analysis.
Table VIII. Excluded Variables
VARIABLE NAME
Number of Male Terrorists
Number of Female Terrorists
Mean Age of Group Members
Age Range of Group Members
Number of Prisoners' Release Demanded
Number of Prisoners Released
Length of Terrorist Event
EXCLUSION RATIONALE
Too few cases (15)
Too few cases (17)
Too few cases (1)
Too few cases (8)
Too few cases (38)
Too few cases (41)
Mai-Distributed data and very
low correlation between raw
and transformed data
D. FACTOR ANALYSIS
Factor analysis was conducted prior to subjecting the variables to
multiple regression analysis. Factoring was conducted for the purposes
of parsimony and to preclude multicollinearity . It was necessary to re-
duce the number of variables for the final phases of the analysis while
retaining the essential nature of the factors represented by the combina-
tion of the variables loading together on the factor. Factoring was con-
ducted in several stages: first the variables developed from the ITERATE
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file were factored, utilizing all 214 cases in the universe of analysis.
The next stage involved factoring the independent variables from the
ITERATE file, using the 29 cases from the random sample under study.
These two stages identified the factors and validated the loadings
achieved in the sample with the loading achieved in the universe of
analysis. Finally, all independent variables were factored together,
the results of which are shown in Table IX.
Factoring was conducted with the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences program for orthogonal rotated factoring. The number of fac-
tors for the final rotation was pre-established as four, based upon the
emergence of four factors during previous factorings.














Number of Terrorist Groups














E. FINAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Based upon the results of Table IX factoring, the following factors
were identified and representative variables selected for further analysis
1. Factor One incorporated six separate variables obtained through
quantitative content analysis methods of extracting data from FBIS. Total
Number of FBIS Lines Per Event, Numher of Country Lines Per Event, Number
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of FBIS Daily Report Issue Dates Per Event, Number of FBIS Articles Per
Event and Number of Expanded Directional and Atomic Assertion Statements
Per Event all loaded on one factor and are highly correlated with one
another. FBIS Daily Report Issue Dates loaded highest within the group
of variables and was selected as the variable to represent FBIS quantita-
tive content.
2. Factor Two involved the extent of the demands made by terrorists
during a terrorist incident. This factor was statistically comprised of
the number of governments upon whom demands were made by the terrorists,
the number of separate international entities upon whom demands were made
during a terrorist incident, and the number of hostages taken during the
incident. The factor represented a measure of the direct international
involvement of legitimate international actors as a consequence of a
terrorist incident. The number of separate international entities upon
whom demands were made in a terrorist incident was used as a representa-
tive variable for this factor in multiple regression analysis.
3. Factor Three comprised the two qualitative content variables,
Atomic Assertion and Expanded Directional Analysis loaded together and
separate from other factored independent variables. In view of the higher
loading factor, more thorough methods of insuring reliability, and higher
bivariate correlation, Atomic Assertion Analysis was selected to represent
the terrorist group's perceived saliency of enemy threat.
4. Factor Four involved the degree of cooperation between terrorist
groups associated with a terrorist incident. This factor was comprised




The following important variables did not load significantly on any
of the factors but were considered to be key variables in the explanation
of experts' perceptions of terrorist threat:
1. FBIS Lines Prior To The Terrorist Incident
2. Number of Terrorists Involved In The Incident
3. Number of Victims' Nationalities
4. Number of Domestic Non-Combatants Killed
5. Number of Foreign Non-Combatants Killed
All of the above variables were retained for further analysis except
the Number of Victims' Nationalities, which was eliminated from further
analysis due to the high correlation with the key variable, Number of
Terrorists. The variable Number of Terrorists was considered more im-
portant for further analysis and was retained in lieu of Number of
Victims' Nationalities, based upon its potential as a predictor of the
future threat which a terrorist group may represent.
F. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
1 . General
Multiple regression analysis was conducted primarily as a de-
scriptive tool. The objective of the analysis was to determine what
portion of the variance in the dependent variable was directly attribut-
able to each of the independent variables; e.g., in one multiple regres-
sion equation, it was determined that the independent variable Number of
Foreign Non-Combatants Killed explained fifteen per cent of the threat
as perceived by the research community.
The multiple regression was conducted utilizing the regression
sub-program of the Statistical Package For The Social Sciences. The




stepwise forward inclusion of variables was used to compute the multiple
regression correlation of independent variables with the dependent
variables.
2. Independent Variables
The multiple regression was conducted in two phases. Initially,
the following independent variables were included in the regression
equation:
a. Number of FBIS Issue Dates Per Event
b. Number of FBIS Lines Prior To Incident
c. Atomic Content Analysis Scale
d. Number of Foreign Non-Combatants Killed
e. Number of Entities Upon Whom Demands Were Made
f. Number of Terrorist Groups Participating In Incident
g. Number of Terrorist Individuals Participating In Incident
h. Number of Domestic Non-Combatants Killed
The above listed variables were developed during the data collection and
had been factored in the initial phases of the data analysis in paragraph
D above
.
The second phase of the multiple regression analysis was conducted
utilizing a series of nominal level dummy independent variables in ad-
dition to the independent variables used in the initial multiple regres-
sions. This phase had the objective of determining which nominal level
variables having some degree of implicit association with terrorist threat
did in fact explain a significant portion of the variance in the dependent
variables.
3. Selection of The Nominal Level Dummy Independent Variables
The ITERATE File contains a series of nominal level variables which
all had some degree of implicit association with the threat represented by
international terrorism. The nominal level independent variables were
selected for analysis by multiple regression and were entered into the
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regression analysis which was composed of the independent variables from
the initial phase of the multiple regression analysis. The following
variables were used as dummy variables having only two nominal states:
"yes" or "no."
a. Geographical Location of The Incident
Five geographic locations were defined: Latin America, South
America, North America, Europe and The Middle East. It was hypothesized
that for geopolitical reasons, it was possible that perceptions of terror-
ist threat may be associated with the location in which the incident took
place.
b. Terrorist Discriminate Selection of The Target
Discriminate target selection on the part of a terrorist
group indicated an ability to plan and execute a more extensive type of
operation than is necessary to attack a target of opportunity. It was
hypothesized that this added degree of operational capability was assoc-
iated with perception of greater threat for terrorist incidents involving
discriminate target selection.
c. United States Citizen Victims of The Terrorist Incident
Due to the greater overall impact associated with attacks on
United States citizens by terrorists, it was hypothesized that such in-
cidents may have been perceived as having greater threat to the United
States national security objectives.
d. Terrorist Incident Involving Attack on Official United States
Installation
It was hypothesized that the physical and psychological impact
of a terrorist attack on an official United States installation would re-
sult in an increase of the threat perceptions for this type incident.
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e. Terrorist Group Identified As Fedayeen
It was hypothesized that the fanatical image surrounding the
Fedayeen terrorist groups would contribute to the perception of threat
associated with terrorist incidents involving Fedayeen groups.
4. Multiple Regression Correlation Results
The complete results of the regression analysis conducted in
both phases of the analysis are contained in Appendix K, which is a
summary of multiple regression (R increase associated with each of
ITERATE and Content Analysis independent variables in the regression
equation), and Appendix L, a summary of multiple regression (R^ increase
associated with the inclusion of the nominal level independent variables
in the regression equation) . The most significant results of both
phases of regression are displayed in the Tables X through XIV.
Tables X and XI contain the results of the regression conducted
during the first phase, with the dependent variables representing the
overall threat perceptions of all the experts and the average threat
perception for all the communities involved.
Table X.
Regression of The Dependent Variable "Overall Threat"
With The Initial Interval Level Independent Variables
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Number of FBIS Issue Dates
Number of Terrorist Groups
Number of Foreign Non-
Combatants Killed
Number of Terrorists
Number of FBIS Lines Prior
Number of Domestic Non-
Combatants Killed
Atomic Content Analysis Scl
TOTAL
Constant
Overall Level of Significance 0.05




.39 .UK B < 1.42 .005
.008 1.16 -1.9 < B < 4.2 More Than .1
.02 .17 - .36 < B < .69 ii
.004 .18 - .9 < B < 1.28 ii
.002 -.04 - .3 < B < .228 u
.0008 -.12 -1.4 < B < 1.14 ii






Regression of The Dependent Variable "Average Threat"
With The Initial Interval Level Independent Variable






Number of FBIS Dates < B < .8 .005
Number of Foreign Non- .1 .36 o < 3 < .74 .01
Combatants Killed
Atomic Content Analysis Scl .04 .05 -.04 < B < .13 More Than .5
Number of Entities Demands .02 .09 -.17 < B < .4 it
Made Upon
Number of FBIS Lines Prior .008 .05 -.14 < B < .23 it
To Event
Number of Terrorist Groups .005 -.47 -1.6 < B < 1 .6 ii




Overall Level of Significance .025
Tables XII and XIII contain the results of the regression analysis
conducted with the same dependent variable in the second phases of the
analysis. The tables show the results of the addition of the independent
variables indicating that United States citizens were involved as victims
in the terrorist incident.
All of the tables X through XIII follow the same format: the
percentage of the variance explained by each independent variable is
indicated (R2 ) ; the regression coefficient for each variable is indicated
(B) ; the range of the 95% confidence interval calculated on a T distribu-





Regression of The Dependent Variable "Overall Threat"
With The Initial Variables And The Nominal Level
Independnet Variable Indicating If A United States





Number of FBIS Issue Dates
Number of FBIS Lines Prior
Number of Entities Demands
Made Upon
Number of Foreign Non-
Combatants Killed
Number of Terrorist Groups
Atomic Content Analysis Scl
Number of Terrorists




Overall Level of Significance 0.25




45 1.12>B > .27 .005
17 .8 .2 < B< 1.45 .005
01 -.13 - .39< B< .13 .05




.005 -.74 -3.8 < B< 2.4 ti
.005 .02 - .07< B< .1 II
.003 -.2 -1.3 < B< .88 II
.0005 .09 -1.0 < B< 1.3 tl
Regression of The Dependent
Table XIII.
Variable "Average Threat" With The Initial
Interval Level Independent Variables And The Nominal Level Variable
Indicating If A United States Citizen Was Victim of The Terrorist Incident
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Number of FBIS Issue Dates
US Citizen Victims
Number of Terrorist Groups
Atomic Content Analysis Scl
Number of Entities Demands
Made Upon
Number of Terrorists
Number of Foreign Non-
Combatants Killed
Number of FBIS Lines Prior
To Event









36 - .13< B < .55 .025
11 .4 .6 > B >.17 .005
14 -2.9 -4.94 < B<-.9 .005
08 .06 - .12 < B<-.007 .025
05 .3 - .04 < B< .64 .005
06 -.6 -1.2 < B < .07 .025
007 .12 - .19 < B< .43 More Than .
5
001 .02 - .12 < B < .17 ii
0004 -.06 - .72 < B <.59 it
4.62
Overall Level of Significance Less Than .005
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Table XIV presents the results of one of the more significant
multiple regression analyses found. This regression is of the depend-
ent variable representing the threat perceptions of government experts
and includes the independent variable indicating if an official United
States installation was the target of the terrorist incident.
Table XIV
Regression of The Dependent Variable "Government Threat" With The Initial
Independent Variables And The Nominal Level Variable United States Official
Installation Involved As A Target In The Terrorist Incident
INDEPENDENT 2 95?6 CONFIDENCE LEVEL OF
VARIABLES R B INTERVAL SIGNIFICANCE
Number of FBIS Issue Dates .260 .70 -0.08<B<1.50 .025
US Official Installation .160 .95 0.18<B<1.70 .005
Atomic Content Analysis .040 .06 -0.04<B<0.17 .250
Number of Terrorists .013 .53 -0.80 <B< 1.87 More Than
Number of Foreign Non-
Combatants Killed .011 .23 -0.40<B<0.87 " "
Number of Terrorist Groups .002 .43 -3.28<B<4.14 " "
Number of FBIS Lines Prior .001 .03 -0.29 <B< 0.55 " "
TOTAL .48
CONSTANT 2 . 80
Level of Significance of The Overall Regression Equation .05
5. Multiple Regression Correlation Findings
.
Based on the results of the multiple regression correlations the
following conclusions were derived concerning the significance of the
various independent variables and the amount of the variance in the
dependent variable which the independent variables explained:
a. The variable FBIS Daily Report Issues Per Terrorist Event
explained more of the variance in the dependent variables than any of
the other independent variables developed through content analysis. It
was the only content analysis-associated independent variable that was
statistically significant in the regression analysis equation.
h. The independent variables indicating the FBIS Lines Prior to
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a terrorist incident and the variable developed with the atomic content
analysis methodology were not significant in explaining any of the
variance of the dependent variables in the regression equations.
c. The independent variable Number of Terrorists Involved in
the incident, was used as the representative variable' for the factor
associated with the total human involvement in the terrorist incident.
This variable explained more of the variance in the dependent variables
that any of the other interval level variables from the ITERATE file.
d. The independent variable representing the Number of Foreign
Non-Combatants Killed in the terrorist incident was significant in the
explanation of the variance of the dependent variable Academic Threat
Perceptions.
e. The independent variables Number Of Terrorist Groups, Number
Of Entities Upon Whom Terrorist Demands Were Made, and Number Of Domestic
Non-Combatants Killed were not significant in explaining any of the
variance in the dependent variables.
f. The nominal level variable indicating that a U.S. Citizen
Was The Victim in the terrorist incident explained the largest percentage
of the variance in the dependent variables Overall Threat, Government
Threat, Military Threat, Private Enterprise Threat and Law Enforcement
Threat.
g. The variable indicating that the Terrorist Target Was
Selectively Chosen was significant in explaining the variance in the
dependent variables Government, Law Enforcement, Research, Overall and
Average Threat.
h. The nominal level variable indicating that an Official
U.S. Installation Was Involved As A Target in the terrorist incident was
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significant in explaining the variance in one dependent variable:
Government Threat.
i. The variable indicating the terrorists were identified as
Fedayeen was not significant in explaining the variance in any of the
dependent variables.
j . No specific geographic location for the occurrence of terrorist
incidents was significant in explaining the variance in any of the
dependent variables.
6. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis Findings
The combination of variables which were statistically most signifi-
cant in explaining the variance of each dependent variable is presented be-
low. The independent variables were significant at the .05 level or better
and were arranged in order of decreasing significance.
a. The Overall, Military and Private Enterprise Threat variables'
variance were best explained by the combination of the inde-
pendent variables U.S. Citizen Victims and FBIS Issue Dates.
b. The Government Threat variable's variance was best explained
by the independent variables Official U.S. Installation Being
The Target of The Incident and FBIS Issue Dates.
c. The Law Enforcement Threat variable's variance was best ex-
plained by the combination of Selective Target Chosen By The
Terrorists and Number of FBIS Issue Dates.
d. None of the independent variables were significant in the ex-
planation of the variance in the Academic and Research Threat
variables
.
e. The Average Threat variable's variance was best explained by
the combination of the following independent variables: United
States Citizens Victim, FBIS Issue Dates and Number of Foreign
Non-Combatants Killed.
Table XV contains the standardized regression coefficients (Betas)
for each of the independent variables. The Betas for the independent
variables utilized in the first phases of the regression were obtained
as a result of entering all these variables into the regression analysis.
The Betas for the nominal level variables utilized in the second phases
of the regression analysis were obtained when these variables were entered




Table of Standardized Regression Coefficients (Beta)
Unless otherwise indicated, the Betas are significant at the .05 level
or higher. Less significant Betas are included when the specific
multiple regression did not result in a higher level of significance.
The less significant Betas are provided to indicate the variable that
is responsible for most of the change in the variance of the dependent
variable.
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT VARIABLES
VARIABLES QVRL GOV MIL BUS LAW ACADEMIA RSRCH AVERAGE
Number of FBIS
Issue Dates .56 .21**. 55 .42
Number of Foreign
Non- Combatants
Killed .35* .35 .36
Number of
Terrorists .25**. 26** -.36
US Citizen Victim. 63 .60 .76 .52 .69 .51
Discriminate





.25 Level of Significance
*
.10 Level of Significance
The Betas represent regression coefficients where the unit of
measurement has been standardized for all variables. It is thus
possible to directly compare the Betas for the purpose of evaluating
the contribution which each variable makes to the relative change of the
variance of the dependent variable.
From Table XV we can conclude the following:
a. The independent variable, U.S. Citizen Victim Of The Incident
caused the largest and most significant change in the threat perceptions
of all the experts as represented in both the Overall and the Average
scales, and in the perceptions of threat held by the experts in the
Government, Military and Business communities. It made a significant
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relative change in the threat perceptions of the Law Enforcement
experts.
b. The independent variable Discriminate Target Selection by
the terrorists was the most significant and caused the largest change
in the perceptions of threat held by the Law Enforcement experts. It
made a smaller but still significant change in the perception of all
the experts and in the separate perceptions of Government and Mili-
tary experts.
c. The independent variable U.S. Official Installation Attacked
made a significant relative change in the threat perceptions of the
Government and the Military experts.
d. The independent variable Number of FBIS Issue Dates devoted
to the terrorist incident made a highly significant and large change
to the threat perceptions of all the experts as expressed in both the
Overall and the Average scales. It also made a significant relative
change in the perceptions of the Law Enforcement experts.
e. The independent variable Number of Foreign Non-Combatants
Killed was the only variable which made a noteworthy relative change
to the threat perceptions of the Academic and Policy Research experts;
it was also a significant variable in explaining the change in the
threat perceptions of all the experts as expressed in the Average
threat scale.
f. The independent variable Number of Terrorists Involved made





7. Time Series Analysis
In determining to what extent the threat perceptions of the ex-
perts concerning terrorism were related to time, it was recognized that
perceptions of increasing threat over time would have a significant im-
pact on the overall analysis. It was necessary to analyze the correla-
tion between the threat and time. Time was computed by setting the
first month of the period of analysis equal to one and the last month
equal to eighty-four. The time series analysis was conducted utilizing
Pearson product moment. The results of this correlation are presented
in Table XVI. Table XVI presents the percentage of the variance in
threat perception associated with time (R^) and the significance level
for each R^.




























Based on the results shown in Table XVI, it is possible to
conclude that there is no linear correlation to indicate that the






The methodology employed to: (a) survey experts concerning their
perceptions of terrorist threat, and (b) transform their ordinal judg-
ments into an interval scale, provided a measurement of the threat of
terrorist incidents, which proved to be valid and useful means of cor-
relating threat with other aspects of terrorist incidents. The threat
perceptions of those experts representing the various communities
directly involved in combating terrorism (e.g., government and law
enforcement) were highly correlated with each other. However, the
threat perceptions of those experts studying terrorism and conducting
policy research relative to terrorism were significantly different
from the perceptions of the experts directly involved in combating
terrorism. The combination of the threat perceptions of all the experts
into either an overall or an average threat scale resulted in a scale
which correlated highly with the perceptions of those experts involved
in directly combating terrorism. The combined scales did not correlate
with the perceptions of those experts doing research and studying ter-
rorism.
B. ITERATE VARIABLES
The aspects of terrorist incidents drawn from the ITERATE File
related generally to the method of operation of the terrorist group.
Two sub-sets of aspects existed in these variables: (a) those aspects
which were generally accepted and relatively obvious contributors to
the threat perceptions associated with a terrorist incident (e.g.,
U.S. citizens as the victim of the incident) , and (b) those aspects
which were less obvious contributers to the threat associated with a
terrorist incident (e.g., the number of terrorists involved in the
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incident) . Variables from both of these aspects of terrorist methods of
operation proved to be significant contributors to the threat associated
with a terrorist incident.
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS
The qualitative content analysis methodologies used to determine
the terrorist group's perceived saliency of its enemy produced interval
scales which did not correlate highly with any of the dependent
perceived threat variables derived from experts, nor did it contribute
to explaining a significant degree of variance in the regression
equation. Accordingly, the study indicated that the perceived saliency
of a terrorist group's enemy is not a primary or significant threat to
U.S. national security as perceived by expert respondents.
The quantitative content analysis methodology of lines in FBIS
relating to indicators of the terrorist event prior to the initiation
of the incident was developed as a possible predictor of terrorist
activity. The independent variable of FBIS lines prior to an event did
not correlate significantly with any of the dependent variables, nor
did it contribute to explaining a significant degree of the variance in
the regression equation. Accordingly, the study indicated that FBIS
content prior to a terrorist event is not an indicator of threat to
U.S. national security as perceived by expert respondents.
As indicated in factor analysis, several quantitative content
analysis variables loaded together around FBIS Daily Report Issues and
were a representative factor variable for FBIS content in general. FBIS
2
content had the highest R of all independent variables with a Beta
of .77 at a .005 significance level in the regression equation. Also,
FBIS content contributed most to the relative change in all the dependent
variables during regression analysis and was significant in explaining
most of the variance for all dependent variables. Accordingly, the study
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indicated that FBIS content is directly related to the perception of U.S.
national security as perceived by expert respondents.
D. ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS
The ITERATE File was found to be the broadest based available data
source for the study of international terrorism. Based on the findings
of this study, the following comments are provided for improving the
utility of the ITERATE data file:
1. Increase the source documents used for data collection, including
FBIS Daily Report issues, The Los Angeles Times and The London Times .
2. Incorporate a set of variables to measure and represent the
cultural and ethnic traditions and constraints felt by the terror-
ist group which could influence its methods of operation.
3. Incorporate a set of variables to measure and represent the linkages
which exist between the terrorist group involved in the terrorist
incident and other terrorist groups.
4. Incorporate a set of variables to measure and represent the linkages
existing between a terrorist group involved in a terrorist incident
and other international actors.
5. Incorporate a set of variables that measure and represent a terror-
ist group's demands, patterns and negotiating behavior.
6. Incorporate a set of variables that represent the results of con-
tent analysis of terrorist statements.
Further refinement and updating of information in the ITERATE File
could contribute significantly to statistical evaluation and analysis of
terrorist activity and operational patterns of terrorist groups. Present-
ly missing data which is available in open source literature would con-
tribute greatly to the excellent statistical data file contained in the
ITERATE File.
Two specific recommendations are submitted for future research dedicated
to scaling expert respondent results:
1. Develop a more sophisticated consensus model for integrating the
opinions of experts in the various communities into a scale to re-
present the overall threat perceptions of high-level decision makers.
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2. Develop a feedback mechanism which would permit updating of threat
scales based upon changing national security objectives relative
to the international situation and the emergence of varying types
of terrorist methods.
As can be determined by a review of FBIS content raw data, certain
terrorist events in certain countries are covered thoroughly, whereas
other events in different countries have little or no FBIS coverage. An
in-depth study of terrorist activity coverage in FBIS by country may be
profitable in the reallocation of resources for the publication of FBIS
Daily Report issues.
Finally, a further analysis of classified files using Atomic Assertion
Content Analysis methodology for scoring terrorist statements in relation
to perceived enemy threat may reveal causative effects and/or correlation




DIMENSIONS OF SALIENCY OF ENEMY PERCEPTIONS
1. Highly Salient Active Threat -- the enemy is perceived as engag-
ing in activity immediately threatening, hostile to the group's interests
and requiring attention activity by the group.
2. Highly Salient Strong Threat -- the enemy is considered to have
potential or actual capabilities of taking direct or indirect actions
which adversely affect the group, with a high probability of success,
unless action is taken to check, equal or surpass his power.
3. Highly Salient Proximate Threat -- the enemy is perceived as
close in time, space and meaning and there is considerable involvement,
interaction or conflict with him.
4. Highly Salient Ego-Relevant -- the central elements of the group's
self-image (i.e., stands, beliefs, responses or attitudes) are affected
or influenced by the enemy or the enemy's perceived presence.
5. Low Salient Passive Threat -- the enemy is less threatening, less
engaged in activity which is immediately hostile and less demanding of
the group's attention.
6. Low Salient Weak Threat -- the enemy is not perceived as having
sufficient power to take successful actions against the group, requiring
only a monitoring effort of the enemy's activities and minimizing his
chance for future gains at the group's expense.
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7. Low Salient Distant Threat -- the enemy is perceived as being
remote in time, space and meaning with little likelihood of perceived
confrontation.
8. Low Salient Ego- Irrelevant -- the enemy does not have a great




DESCRIPTIVES OF TERRORIST EVENTS
EVENT #2 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 16 JANUARY 1968, GUATEMALA
GUNMEN IN A PASSING CAR SHOT TO DEATH COLONEL JOHN D. WEBBER, COMMANDER
OF THE 34-MAN U.S. MILITARY GROUP IN GUATEMALA AND LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
ERNEST A. MUNRO, HEAD OF THE MILITARY GROUP'S NAVY SECTION, AS THEY WERE
RETURNING FROM LUNCH. TWO ENLISTED MEN WERE WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK. THE
FOLLOWING DAY THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FAR) DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS
STATING THAT IT HAD EXECUTED THE TWO U.S. OFFICIALS BECAUSE GUATEMALAN
MILITARY GROUPS "CREATED BY AMERICAN ORDERS" HAD KILLED THOUSANDS OF
GUATEMALANS. THE KILLING OF WEBBER AND MUNRO WAS ALSO REPORTED TO BE IN
REVENGE FOR THE DEATH OF ROGELIA CRUZ MARTINEZ, A FORMER "MISS GUATEMALA,"
WHO HAD BEEN BRUTALLY SLAIN BY LA MANO BLANCO, A RIGHT-WING TERRORIST GROUP,
BECAUSE OF HER LEFTIST CONTACTS.
EVENT #13 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 4 JULY 1968, UNITED STATES
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL TOURIST OFFICE IN NEW YORK CITY WAS BOMBED
BY EL PODER CUPANO, AN ANTI -CASTRO GROUP.
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EVENT #31 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 12 OCTOBER 1968, BRAZIL
MEMBERS OF THE VANGUARDA POPULAR REVOLUC IONAIRA (VPR) KILLED U.S. ARMY
CAPTAIN CHARLES R. CHANDLER BY MACHINE GUN FIRE IN FRONT OF HIS HOME IN
SAO PAULO. ACCORDING TO U.S. OFFICIALS, CAPTAIN CHANDLER WAS STUDYING
BRAZILIAN AND PORTUGUESE HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO BEFORE
TAKING A TEACHING ASSIGNMENT AT WEST POINT. LEAFLETS LEFT NEAR HIS BODY
ACCUSED HIM OF BEING A "VIETNAMESE WAR CRIMINAL." LEFTISTS CLAIMED THAT
HE HAD BEEN SENT TO BRAZIL TO ORGANIZE AND TRAIN RIGHT-WING TERRORIST
GROUPS
.
EVENT #50 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 20 MAY 1969, CANADA
TWO CUBAN REFUGEES WERE ARRESTED IN NEW JERSEY AFTER THEY HAD ATTEMPT-
ED TO BOMB THE CUBAN CONSULATE IN MONTREAL.
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EVENT #56 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 20 JUNE 1969, URUGUAY
TWO TUPAMARO TERRORISTS, DRESSED IN POLICE UNIFORMS, ATTACKED A
FACILITY OF GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION IN MONTEVIDEO, CAUSING DAMAGE
ESTIMATED AT $1 MILLION DOLLARS.
EVENT #68 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1969, BRAZIL
IN RIO DE JANEIRO, MEMBERS OF THE MOVIMENTO REVOLUCIONARIO-8 (MR- 8) AND
ACTION FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION (ALN) KIDNAPPED CHARLES BURKE ELBRICK, U.S.
AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL. THE KIDNAPPERS TOOK ELBRICK FROM HIS CAR AND LEFT A
RANSOM NOTE DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF 15 PRISONERS WHO WERE TO BE FLOWN TO
ALGERIA, CHILE OR MEXICO, AND DEMANDING THE PUBLICATION OF AN ANT I GOVERNMENT
MANIFESTO. THE KIDNAPPERS NEGOTIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT BY NOTES.
THEIR DEMANDS PLACED A GREAT STRAIN ON THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT, A MILITARY
JUNTA THAT HAD ASSUMED POWER ONLY A FEW DAYS EARLIER WHEN THE PRESIDENT SUF-
FERED A STROKE. HARDLINERS WITHIN THE MILITARY WHO DID NOT WANT TO ACCEDE TO
THE KIDNAPPERS' DEMANDS SPLIT WITH THOSE WHO WERE WILLING TO ACCEDE IN ORDER
TO GAIN THE AMBASSADOR'S RELEASE. ON SEPT. 5, THE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO RE-
LEASE THE PRISONERS AND AUTHORIZED BRAZILIAN NEWSPAPERS TO PUBLISH THE MANI-
FESTO. THE DEAL WAS ALMOST UPSET AT THE FINAL MOMENT WHEN PARATROOPERS IN
RIO DE JANEIRO ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT THE PLANE CARRYING THE PRISONERS FROM
TAKING OFF. THE PARATROOPERS WERE ORDERED BACK TO THEIR BARRACKS, HOWEVER,
AND THE PLANE LEFT FOR MEXICO ON SEPT. 6. AMBASSADOR ELBRICK WAS RELEASED
ON SEPT. 7.
FOLLOWING THE EPISODE, BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES INITIATED A ROUND-UP OF
LEFTIST SUSPECTS, ARRESTING AS MANY AS 4,000. THIS WAS THE FIRST OF THE
DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS, A PRACTICE THAT SPREAD RAPIDLY THROUGHOUT LATIN
AMERICA IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
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EVENT #102 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 6 MARCH 1970, GUATEMALA
MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FAR) KIDNAPPED SEAN HOLLY,
U.S. LABOR ATTACHE, AND DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF FOUR PRISONERS, HELD BY
GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES, IN RETURN FOR HOLLY'S RELEASE. THE GOVERNMENT,
WHICH HAD FACED A SIMILAR INCIDENT WHEN ALBERTO FUENTES MOHR, GUATEMALAN
FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS KIDNAPPED ON FEBRUARY 27, AGAIN AGREED TO MEET THE
KIDNAPPERS' DEMANDS. TWO OF THE PRISONERS WERE TURNED OVER TO THE COSTA
RICAN EMBASSY ON MARCH 7, BUT THE OTHER TWO COULD NOT BE LOCATED. ONE,
WHO WAS NOT IN PRISON AS THE KIDNAPPERS BELIEVED, MADE HIS OWN WAY TO THE
COSTA RICAN EMBASSY AND WAS GRANTED ASYLUM. THE FOURTH CONTACTED THE FAR
FROM TAPACHULA, MEXICO, WHERE HE HAD BEEN STAYING. THE KIDNAPPERS RELEASED
HOLLY ON MARCH 8.
EVENT #112 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 31 MARCH 1970, JAPAN
NINE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED RED ARMY (URA) HIJACKED A JAPAN AIR LINES
PLANE AND ORDERED IT FLOWN TO PYONGYANG, NORTH KOREA. IN AN ELABORATE
RUSE, OFFICIALS DISGUISED SEOUL'S AIRPORT TO LOOK LIKE PYONGYANG'S AND
THE PLANE LANDED IN SEOUL, BUT THE HIJACKERS WERE NOT FOOLED. THEY LET
THE PASSENGERS DISEMBARK IN SEOUL, HOWEVER; THEN FLEW ON TO PYONGYANG.
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EVENT #142 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 22 JULY 1970, GREECE
SIX ARAB GUERRILLAS HIJACKED AN OLYMPIC AIRWAYS 727 AIRLINER OVER
RHODES AFTER IT HAD TAKEN OFF FROM BEIRUT, AND ORDERED IT FLOWN TO CAIRO.
THEY DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF SEVEN OTHER ARAB GUERRILLAS BEING HELD BY
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FOR THE ATTACK ON AN EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES PLANE
(DECEMBER 26, 1969), FOR AN ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF A TWA AIRPLANE (DECEM-
BER 24, 1969), AND FOR AN ATTACK ON THE EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES OFFICE IN
ATHENS (NOVEMBER 27, 1969).
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY, THE GREEK
GOVERNMENT PROMISED TO RELEASE THE PRISONERS WITHIN ONE MONTH, AND THE
55 PASSENGERS AND CREW OF THE OLYMPIC AIRWAYS PLANE WERE RELEASED. THE
PALESTINIAN POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE OPERATION.
OFFICIALS IN CAIRO WELCOMED THE SIX HIJACKERS AND PRAISED THEIR DETERMI-
NATION TO FREE THEIR COLLEAGUES. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WENT AHEAD WITH
THE TRIAL OF TWO OF THE GUERRILLAS WHOSE RELEASE HAD BEEN AGREED TO (THE
OTHER FIVE HAD ALREADY BEEN SENTENCED) . THEY WERE FOUND GUILTY AND SEN-
TENCED TO PRISON TERMS TOTALING MORE THAN 29 YEARS, BUT WERE RELEASED ON
AUGUST 12 ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT ON JULY 22.
EVENT #161 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1970, LEBANON, EGYPT § JORDAN
THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) HIJACKED A
BOAC VC-10 AND FLEW TO DAWSON FIELD IN JORDAN (BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF HOSTAGES HELD IN THE DESERT TO 300 AS SOME HOSTAGES WERE ALREADY HELD
THERE FROM PREVIOUS HIJACKINGS) . NEGOTIATIONS TO FREE THEM WERE COMPLICATED
BY THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN JORDANIAN TROOPS AND PALESTINIAN GUER-
RILLAS. ON SEPTEMBER 12, THE REMAINING PASSENGERS (WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAD
BEEN REMOVED EARLIER) WERE EVACUATED AND THE 3 PLANES (2 OF WHICH WERE
THERE FROM PREVIOUS HIJACKINGS) WERE BLOWN UP. MOST OF THE PASSENGERS WERE
SOON RELEASED, BUT THE PFLP CONTINUED TO HOLD 58 HOSTAGES TO EXERT PRESSURE
ON THE- EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED ON SEPT. 25, 26 AND
29. ON SEPT. 29, THE SWISS AND WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD FREE 7 ARAB
GUERRILLAS WHEN THE LAST 6 HOSTAGES (WHO WERE U.S. CITIZENS) HAD LEFT JORDAN.
THE 7 PRISONERS WERE RELEASED AND FLOWN TO CAIRO ON SEPTEMBER 30.
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EVENT #220 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 29 MAY 1971, SPAIN
BASQUE NATIONALISTS ATTEMPTED TO KIDNAP HENRI WOLIMER, THE FRENCH
CONSUL, IN SAN SEBASTIAN. HE RESISTED AND ESCAPED.
EVENT #239 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 15 DECEMBER 1971, UNITED KINGDOM
BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION (BSO) MEMBERS ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE
ZAID RIFAI, THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.
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EVENT #250 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1972, UNITED KINGDOM
A BOMB PLANTED BY THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA), PROVISIONAL WING,
EXPLODED AT ALDERSHOT ARMY BASE IN ENGLAND, KILLING SEVEN AND WOUNDING
FIVE, TWO OF WHOM SUBSEQUENTLY DIED.
EVENT #281 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 16 AUGUST 1972, ITALY
AN EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES PLANE WAS DAMAGED, SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF
FROM ROME, BY A BOMB CONCEALED IN ITS LUGGAGE COMPARTMENT. THE BOMB HAD
BEEN HIDDEN IN A RECORD PLAYER GIVEN TO TWO ENGLISH GIRLS BY TWO ARABS.
A NEW GUERRILLA GROUP, CALLING ITSELF NATIONALIST GROUP FOR THE LIBERATION
OF PALESTINE, CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ATTACK. TWO ARABS WERE RELEASED BY
ITALIAN AUTHORITIES AFTER A SHORT DETENTION.
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EVENT #283 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 29 AUGUST 1972, GREECE
A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ATHENS, CAUSING SLIGHT DAMAGE
THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE GROUP CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE INCIDENT.
EVENT #329 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 23 JANUARY 1973, HAITI
TWO ARMED MEN AND ONE WOMAN KIDNAPPED CLINTON E. KNOX, U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO HAITI, AND HELD HIM HOSTAGE IN HIS OWN RESIDENCE. WHEN U.S. CONSUL
GENERAL WARD L. CHRISTENSEN ARRIVED AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, HE TOO
WAS TAKEN HOSTAGE. IN RETURN FOR THE TWO AMERICAN HOSTAGES, THE KIDNAPPERS
DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 30 PRISONERS AND A RANSOM OF 1 MILLION DOLLARS.
IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ACTED AS IN-
TERMEDIARY, THE KIDNAPPERS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE RELEASE OF 12 PRISONERS AND
THE PAYMENT OF $70,000. THE KIDNAPPERS RELEASED THEIR HOSTAGES AFTER 18 HOURS
AND FLEW WITH THE RELEASED PRISONERS TO MEXICO. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT GAVE
THE GROUP ASYLUM BUT CONFISCATED THE MONEY. THE GROUP CLAIMED TO BE LINKED
WITH THE COALITION OF NATIONAL BRIGADES, AN ANTI-DUVALIER EXILE ORGANIZATION.
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EVENT #336 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 27 JANUARY 1973, UNITED STATES
A MAN OF ARMENIAN ORIGIN MURDERED THE TURKISH CONSUL GENERAL AND
VICE CONSUL IN LOS ANGELES IN REVENGE FOR TURKISH ATTACKS ON ARMENIANS
IN 1915.
EVENT #349 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 8 MARCH 1973, UNITED KINGDOM
TWO BOMBS EXPLODED IN LONDON, KILLING ONE PERSON .AND INJURING 200
THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) WAS BELIEVED TO BE RESPONSIBLE.
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EVENT #350 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 10 MARCH 1973, UNITED KINGDOM
A BOMB BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN PLANTED BY THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
(IRA) EXPLODED AT A HALL IN GLASGOW WHERE PROTESTANT SUPPORTERS OF
BRITISH RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WERE TO HAVE HELD A DANCE.
EVENT #374 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 21 APRIL 1973, GREECE
A BOMB EXPLODED UNDER THE CAR OF THE ITALIAN VICE CONSUL IN ATHENS.
A GREEK CITIZEN PASSING BY SUFFERED SEVERE INJURIES. A CAR OWNED BY AN
AMERICAN EMPLOYEE OF THE EUROPEAN EXCHANGE SERVICE ALSO WAS SLIGHTLY




EVENT #384 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 30 APRIL 1973, LEBANON
LEBANESE TROOPS ARRESTED FOUR ARAB GUERRILLAS, WHO WERE RIDING IN A
CAR WITH WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES AND A RADIO TRANSMITTER, AS THEY APPROACHED
THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE
BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION (BSO) . POLICE LATER REPORTED THAT FIVE
OTHER ARMED PALESTINIANS WERE ROUNDED UP IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABORTIVE
ATTACK.
EVENT #419 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 19 JULY 1973, GREECE
A LONE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA, ARMED WITH A MACHINE GUN AND HAND GRE-
NADES, ATTEMPTED TO ATTACK THE EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES OFFICE IN ATHENS.
HE WAS PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE OFFICE WHEN A GUARD PRESSED A SECURITY
LOCK THAT CLOSED INNER DOORS MADE OF BULLET-PROOF GLASS. THE TERRORIST
THEN FLED TO A NEARBY HOTEL WHERE HE CORNERED 17 HOSTAGES. NEGOTIATIONS
UNDERTAKEN BY THE AMBASSADOR OF EGYPT, LIBYA AND IRAQ CONTINUED FOR SEVER-
AL HOURS. IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO LET THE TERRORIST FLY TO KUWAIT, WHERE
HE VANISHED. THE HOSTAGES WERE UNHARMED. THE MAN SAID HE WAS A MEMBER OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF VICTIMS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ARAB OFFICIALS SAID
THAT THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ORGANIZATION.
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EVENT #439 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1973, ITALY
ITALIAN MILITARY POLICE ARRESTED FIVE ARAB TERRORISTS WHEN THEY SAID
THEY WERE PLANNING TO SHOOT DOWN AN EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES PLANE AT THE
ROME AIRPORT. ONE OF THE TERRORISTS AND TWO SOVIET MADE PORTABLE HEAT-
SEEKING GROUND TO AIR MISSILES WERE CAPTURED. THE TERRORISTS WENT BEFORE
AN ITALIAN COURT (2 WERE IN ABSENTIA) . THREE OF THE TERRORISTS WERE FOUND
GUILTY AND SENTENCED TO 5 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS IN PRISON, AND THEN RELEASED
ON $29,500 BOND EACH. THE TWO WHO WERE TRIED IN ABSENTIA WERE THOUGHT TO
BE HIDING IN LIBYA.
EVENT #454 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 10 OCTOBER 1973, MEXICO
TERRORISTS KIDNAPPED ANTHONY WILLIAMS, A BRITISH CONSUL IN MEXICO, AND
DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF 51 POLITICAL PRISONERS AND $200,000 RANSOM. THE
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO RELEASE ANY PRISONERS. WILLIAMS WAS RELEAS-
ED UNHARMED ON OCTOBER 14. IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHETHER RANSOM WAS PAID. A




EVENT #470 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 18 DECEMBER 1973, UNITED KINGDOM
TWO BOMBS IN CARS AND A BOMB IN A PARCEL EXPLODED IN LONDON, INJURING
60 PEOPLE. THE INCIDENT WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN IN REPRISAL FOR THE
JAILING OF IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) TERRORISTS WHO BOMBED THE OLD
BAILEY IN MARCH 1973.
EVENT #471 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 20 DECEMBER 1973, SPAIN
PREMIER LUIS CARRERO BLANCO WAS ASSASSINATED IN MADRID, APPARENTLY BY
SIX BASQUE NATIONALISTS. HIS CHAUFFEUR AND A POLICE GUARD WERE ALSO KILL-
ED IN THE EXPLOSION THAT LIFTED THEIR CAR FIVE STORIES OFF THE STREET.
THE BASQUE TERRORIST GROUP, NATION AND LIBERTY (ETA), IN BORDEAUX, FRANCE,
CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ASSASSINATION, SAYING IT WAS IN REVENGE FOR THE




EVENT #487 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1974, UNITED KINGDOM
FOUR GUNMEN CLAIMING MEMBERSHIP IN THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA)
ROBBED A BANK AT STANSTED AIRPORT, NEAR LONDON, OF $80,000.
EVENT #516 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 15 JULY 1974, JAPAN
A JAPAN AIR LINES JETLINER WAS HIJACKED BY A LONE JAPANESE HIJACKER
WHO DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF AN IMPRISONED RED ARMY MEIMBER AND A PLANE TO
FLY THEM TO NORTH KOREA. THE JAPANESE POLICE CAPTURED THE HIJACKER.
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EVENT #517 THE RAND CHRONOLOGY
EVENT DATED 16 JULY 1974, UNITED KINGDOM
A BOMB PLANTED BY THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (IRA) EXPLODED IN


































































































NEGATIVE CONNOTATION COMMON MEANING/ATTITUDE OBJECTS





assassination accomplice establishment not exist
elimination blow up accuse excite not good
execution bomb against exclusive oppress
death burn aggressive exempted outrage
destruction capture ammunition exploit overthrow
kill collar armed false pay
murder combat arms fanatic persecute
rub-out criminal average far from precaution
destroy back-to-the-wall fixed (rigid) pressure
explode barricade farce probation
fight bazooka force (military) prohibit
fire betray fragment propaganda
go off bourgeois got (captured) provoke
(explode) bum hate radical
guerrilla capitalistic hide regret
handcuff caught hostile replace
hijack caution humiliate repress
hostage charge illusion revenge
hurt close impairing security
imprison collect imperil shake-up
jail control impossible sick
kidnap contract impotent smash
no cease fire contrast incident starve
not be freed convict inhuman strategic
prisoner corrupt liar strip
punish counterintelligence lose struggle
revolution cut off mercenary swindle
seize dead line militant take
shoot defeat military talked about
striking demand mistreat target
torture dictatorship mortar terrible
uprising different must go topple
war difficult necks threat
direct negative trap
discontent never treason
disorder no better unexpected
end no concessions violence
enemy no desire weak





























































































































































































MAILING LIST DEMOGRAPHIC DATA AND RESPONSE INFORMATION















Government -25 25 50 26%
-
12 21 33 29%
Military -12 13 25 13% - 8 10 18 16%
Law Enforcement -11 11 22 12% - 6 6 12 10%
Private Enterprise- 11 12 23 12% - 10 5 15 13%
Academia -17 17 34 18% - 7 10 17 15%
Policy Research -18 18 36 19% - 9 10 19 17%
Total -94 96 190 100% _ 52 62 114 100%

APPENDIX G
THREAT SCALE QUESTIONAIRE MAILED TO EXPERTS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA - 93940 in reply refsr to
DECEMBER 1976
DEAR
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS INTENDED TO GATHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL BE
USED IN A GRADUATE THESIS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS TO
DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH EXPERTS GENERALLY AGREE ON THE SERIOUSNESS
TO THE UNITED STATES OF SPECIFIC PAST TERRORIST INCIDENTS. IF A USEFUL
DEGREE OF CONSENSUS IS FOUND, THE RESULTS WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP A SCALE
TO MEASURE THE SERIOUSNESS OF TERRORIST EVENTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO SEE
IF THE EVENTS HAVE COMMON UNDERLYING CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO THIS MEASURE
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY, TERRORIST THREAT SHOULD BE VIEWED
AS A MEASURE OF THE PHYSICAL AND/OR PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF A TERRORIST
INCIDENT WHICH YOU CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS.
U.S. INTERESTS ARE CONSIDERED TO INVOLVE A MULTITUDE OF DIPLOMATIC,
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERACTIONS IMPORTANT TO U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY.
EACH OF THE ENCLOSED CARDS CONTAINS A STANDARDIZED DESCRIPTION OF A
PAST TERRORIST INCIDENT. THESE INCIDENTS WERE SELECTED AT RANDOM FROM A
STRATIFIED LIST OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS OCCURRING FROM 1968
TO 1974. A RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE IS TO REARRANGE THE CARDS UNTIL YOU ARE
SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE RANKED IN ORDER OF SERIOUSNESS. YOUR EXPERT OPINION
ON NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS SHOULD COME INTO PLAY AS YOU RANK THE INCIDENTS.
THE RESULTS SHOULD BE RECORDED ON THE ENCLOSED POST CARD BY RECORDING EACH
INCIDENT DATE ON THE CARD IN DECREASING ORDER OF SERIOUSNESS.
IF YOU WOULD LIKE A REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE,
PLEASE INCLUDE YOUR RETURN ADDRESS ON THE POST CARD. RESPONDENTS WILL
NOT, IN ANY WAY, BE IDENTIFIED IN THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY.





PROCEDURES EMPLOYED FOR OBTAINING AN INTERVAL SCALE FROM THE EXPERTS ORDINAL
JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE THREAT ASSOCIATED WITH A TERRORIST INCIDENT
1. The expert's responses are tallied in a frequency matrix. The number f-
•
represents the number of experts who indicated that incident j was more
threatening than incident i. If a and b are two incidents, the number f .+ f,
is the number of experts comparing the threat of incident a with incident b.
Only the bottom half of the f
.
. matrix has been completed in view of the fact
that the matrix is complimentary around the diagonal axis and the total
number of judges is known (i.e.: the upper half of the matrix is redundant as
it is the arithmatic reciprocal of the upper half of the matrix).
2. From the frequency matrix, a proportion matrix is computed. The p . . matri x
indicates the proportion of the experts comparing the threat associated with i





!J f + f..
Here again only the bottom half of the matrix is included. If a and
b are two incidents, p , + p, =1 making the upper half of the matrix redundant
The diagonal of the matrix is set at = 0.5, based on the assumption of
normal distribution of expert perceptions.
3. Using a table of standard normal probability distribution, a matrix is
prepared of the Z scores for each proportion. The Z. . matrix is symetrical
about the diagonal with the absolute values equal and one cell of the matrix
is the negative value of the corresponding cell across the diagonal. To
avoid the bias that would be introduced by very large or very small Z scores,

p values greater than 0.98 or less than 0.02 are omitted.
ij
4. If the Z. . matrix has no empty cells resulting from extreme p. . values
the column averages are computed as the scale value for each incident.
The relatively large size of the matrix (16 X 16 cells) and general
consensus on the part of the experts regarding the threat ranking of the
incidents on the extremes of the scales resulted in empty cells in all the
matrix. To obtain scale values in this circumstance it was necessary to
solve a set of simultaneous equations using the form:






where j denotes the set of n. elements in column j of the Z. . matrix. The
matrix as developed from the set of simultaneous equations are diagonally
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